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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DONNA I. KNUDSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 14637 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an eminent domain lawsuit which was instituted by the 
City of Provo for the purpose of condemning aerial rights only 
across private property at the end of a runway at the City airport. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The condemnation action went before the Court sitting without 
a jury on the sole issue of damages and the amount of compensation 
to be paid for the taking. The Lower Court awarded compensation in 
the amount of $16,.J.95.00 for the easement taken and $4,500.00 as 
severance damages. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The appellant seeks a reversal of that portion of the judgment 
assessing severance damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is the owner in fee of a 33.37 acre parcel of un-
developed agricultural ground on the south side of Center Street in 
Provo, Utah, in the general vicinity of the appellant's Municipal Air-
port. 
As a part of the airport improvement program funded by the 
F.A.A. the City requested the respondent to grant to the City an 
aerial easement across 13.1961 acres of the respondent's property. The 
closest boundary of the respondent's property to the end of the air-
port was 1428 feet north of the pavement edge, the runway under 
F.A.A. regulations requires a twenty-to-one approach surface so that 
the present height limitation would be 61.4 feet. The minimum ap-
proach surface that could ever be anticipated to be used would be a 
fifty-to-one approach surface which would indicate a height limitation 
of 24.5 feet at the part of respondent's property closest to the airport 
runway. The proposed easement would limit building and vegitation 
growth on the respondent's property within the perimeter of the 
condemned easement to a maximum of 24 feet in height. 
Counsel for the respective parties stipulated that the matter go 
before the Court on the sole issue of compensation to be paid for the 
taking. 
The appraisers selected by the City assessed the damages accru-
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ing by reason of the aerial easement to be one-fourth of the total 
value of the fee. In his opinion, the total value of the property was 
$4,000.00 per acre and he therefore assessed the damages at the rate 
of $1,000.00 per acre for the 13.1961 acres. 
The property was zoned A-1 Agricultural and except for stock 
fences was bare of any improvements, being used as pasture ground 
for cattle. The agricultural zoning at the time of the taking required 
20 acres for one dwelling. The ordinance had been since modified to 
allow a dwelling on each ten acres. Mr. Brown, the City's appraiser 
appraised the value based upon comparables establishing a market 
value of $4,000.00 per acre and based upon the highest and best use 
being that of pasture, and the agricultural uses to which it was then 
devoted. (See partial transcript of trial, Page 11.) The appraisal of 
Mr. Paul Brown was based on the diminution of value of the 13,1691 
acres and he gave as his opinion that there was no damage to the re-
maining approximately twenty acres which were unaffected by the 
aerial easement. 
Mr. 'Vilbur Harding, the appraiser for the land owner gave as 
his opinion that the 13,1961 acres were worth $5,000.00 per acre and 
that the value would be diminished 40 per cent because of the aerial 
easement, or $2,000.00 per acre. (See transcript, Page 39.) 
Mr. Harding felt there was additional damage in the nature of 
severance damage to the remaining property in the amount of 
$9,000.00. 
The apparent formula adopted by the Court in evaluating the 
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taking for the aerial easement only, was to utilize the $5,000.00 per 
acre figure asserted by the property owner's witness and to apply the 
25 per cent damage factor utilized by the City's witness resulting in 
a figure of approximately $1250.00 per acre as the damage occasioned 
to the area within the taking of the easement. The severance damage 
figure used by the Court of $4500.00 is 50 per cent of the figure used 
by the landowner's witness and appears to be a compromise figure 
halfway between the two appraisers' estimates as to severance 
damage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
ALLOWING SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO PROP-
ERTY NOT INCLUDED IN THE AERIAL 
EASEMENT. 
Severance damages are allowed under Utah law only in connec-
tion with a physical taking of land which results in an easily discern-
able damage to the remaining property. 
The applicable statute is 78-34-10 UCA 1953, as amended, 
which reads in part as follows: 
"The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence 
as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, 
and thereupon must ascertain and assess: . . . ( 2) If the 
property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of 
a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the por-
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tion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the construc-
tion of the improvement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff." 
The Utah Supreme Court has considered this aspect of condem-
nation a number of times. The case of Provo River Water Users As-
sociation v. Carlson 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777, stated at Page 779: 
"All of the cases in this Court which we have been able to 
find, have predicated both severance damages and damages 
to lands not taken, on some physical injury to lands not 
condemned ... so as to render it less valuable for purposes 
to which it was formerly adapted ... or some other condi-
tion which would operate to depreciate the market value of 
the property remaining." 
See large number of cases quoted on Page 780 of that opinion. 
The Court goes on further to discuss the aspect of replacing agricul-
tural ground which was not in any way unique, (that being the case of 
the instant lawsuit) in which case the only value to be awarded to the 
condemnee was the value of substitute farmland of substantially the 
same quality. 
Quoting further: 
"Furthermore, even if no uncultivated pasture land were 
available to defendant after his 18.75 acre tract was taken 
by plaintiff, he still would not be entitled to severance dam-
ages if there are in fact other farmlands available for pur-
chase which would produce relatively the same results." 
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This 1943 case has been quoted approvingly by the Utah Supreme 
Court at least three subsequent times and has never been overruled 
and is therefore presumed to still be the law of this jurisdiction. See, 
for instance, State v. Cooperative Security Corp. 1 Ut 2d 178, 264 
P.2d 281 where the Court held that the facts did not warrant sev-
erance damages because there was other contiguous available compar-
able land which easily could have been put to the same use as that 
taken. The Trial Court, who had awarded severance damages gen-
erally was reversed and the same result should be found in this case. 
The suit at law is a condemnation action in which the sole issue 
was the value of the taking of an aerial easement, the sole function of 
which was to limit the height to which buildings or other obstructions 
would be allowed to exist. Such an aviation easement is unique to air-
port cases and is to be strictly differentiated from such things as power 
line easements, etc. The rationale for the doctrine set forth in airport 
cases is stated succinctly in the case of United States v. 48.01 Acres 
of Land 144 F. Supp. 258 at Page 260 as follows: 
"As was held in U.S. v. 4.43 Acres of Land, etc. DC, 137 
F. Supp. 567, 569, the interest acquired "has but one func-
tion, insofar as these condemnation proceedings are con-
cerned, and that is to serve as the ceiling of the land in 
question beyond which obstructions or structures may not he 
allowed to extend upward into the adjacent airspace. I ts 
nomenclature is unimportant." The Court further said that 
by such easements, the Government did not acquire, and 
should not be required to pay compensation, for damages to 
the lands resulting from the flights of aircraft. The ease-
ments there acquired, as here, were limited to the preven-
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tion of obstructions or structures on the land extending into 
the airspace above the "glide angle plane" ... (Emphasis 
added) 
Any loss, or depreciation in value, incident to the low level flights 
of aircraft over the premises has to do with the future, and is not to 
be considered here. 01,son v. U. S. 292 U. S. 246, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 
L. Ed. 1236. 
The fact that a condemnation of ground adjacent to an airport 
does not give rise to "severance damages" is well established in Fed-
eral Law where we find most of the airport cases. For instance, see 
R. E. Boyd et al. v. U.S. 222 F.2d 493. I quote at Page 494: 
The applicable general principles are well settled. "When-
ever there has been an actual physical taking of a part of a 
distinct tract of land, the compensation to be awarded in-
cludes not only the market value of that part of the tract 
appropriated, but the damage to the remainder resulting 
from that taking, ambracing ... injury due to the use to 
which the part appropriated is to be devoted." U. S. v. Griz-
zard 219 U. S. 180, 183, 31 S. Ct. 162, 163, 55 L. Ed. 165, 
31 LRA, NS. 1135. The uses to which an appropriated 
part of a tract is to be devoted means, for purposes of any 
depreciating injury occasioned to its adjoining remainder, 
"the uses to which the land taken may, or probably will, 
be put" Sharp v. U. S. 191 U. S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114, 116, 
48 L. Ed. 211. "but a landowner's right to compensation for 
such a depreciating injury to his remainder has relation only 
to the effecting use that may be made of the taken part of 
his own tract and "does not include the diminution in value 
of the remainder caused by the acquisition and use of ad-
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joining lands of others for the same undertaking." Campbell 
v. U. S., 266 U. S. 368, 372, 45 S. Ct. 115, 117, 69 L. Ed. 
328." (Emphasis added) 
Boyd v. U. S. on Page 4!:16 summarizes the position taken by the 
Federal Courts and sustained by the U. S. Supreme Court, 
" ... It must be remembered in this connection that any sub-
sequent operation of the field in such a manner as to cause 
appellant's remainder to be subject to flights of aircraft 
over it, so low and frequent as to constitute a direct and im-
mediate interference with their enjoyment and use thereof, 
would itself give rise to a wholly independent right of com-
pensation for the appropriation of an easement as to the re-
mainder. See U. S. v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 
90 L. Ed. 206. The present condemnation does not cover 
any such possible, subsequent and additional taking." 
The Federal Courts have adopted this position and have held 
firmly as in the Causby case above cited that the passage of airplanes 
above property will result in a taking for which condemnation must 
result either upon institgation of the government or as an inverse 
condemnation. There is a long line of cases such as Batten v. U. S. 
306 F.2d 580 (1962} in which the Courts found that the operation of 
airplanes which constituted a nuisance to adjacent property over 
which they did not fly did not constitute a taking of an interest in 
the property for which compensation had to be paid because the gov-
ernment did not operate any planes over the property in question. As 
stated in U. S. v. Cress 243 U. S. 316, 328, 37 S. Ct. 380, 385, 61 
L. Ed. 746: 
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"It is the character of the invasion, not the amount of dam-
age resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, 
that determines the question whether or not it is a taking." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE AS THE BASIS 
FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
The Court has erred in allowing speculative evidence to be put 
into the record over objection from counsel as to severance damages 
to properties outside of the condemned area. (See Transcript Pages 
44 and 45.) Counsel for the landowner was asking the questions and 
his own appraiser was giving the answers as set forth below: 
"Q And in considering the reduction in value of $1,000.00 
per acre to this particular nine acres, did you give any effect 
to the fact that that area would not have an easement of 
record on it? 
A That is the reason that I cut the damage in half. They 
could have taller buildings, they could have taller trees, they 
could have this and that that they couldn't have on the yel-
low area. 
Q As you view it, in your opinion, would there be any logic 
in attempting to utilize the nine acres to a more concen-
trated type of building or whatever than the yellow area? 
A No, because of the size of the property. Now there may 
be a few, one or two areas where they put larger homes, and 
one thing anrl another, and they know they are not effected 
by the easement. And so, therefore, it becomes more of an 
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inconvenience of developing and arranging of property. And 
the diminution in value is because of that." 
It is important to remember that this property is zoned agricul-
tural, not residential, and the zoning in effect at the time of the taking 
limited residential use to one residence on each lot having twenty or 
more acres. Highest and best use under the applicable zoning was 
agricultural, yet the Court heard and granted severance damages on 
the assumption that the property would be used for suburban resi-
dential. (See Transcript Page 31.) It is wholly unfair and contrary 
to accepted law to allow such speculative evidence to be the basis for 
a severance figure in addition to already calculated compensation for 
the lands within the taking itself. It is as true in this case as it was in 
the case of U. S. v. 48.01 Acres of Land 144 F. Supp. 258 at Page 
264 where the Court said : 
"There is no evidence to indicate that the utility of the re-
maining lands ... if used solely for farming and agricultural 
purposes, has been, or will be, impaired as a result of the 
easements taken on the aforesaid parcels. Furthermore, the 
proof fails to show that there was, at the time of taking, an 
immediate demand and market for the residential develop-
ments of the land ... 
Agricultural and farming purposes are the only ones to 
which the Finley and Maroney lands have heretofore been 
put. This was true as of the time of taking, and such uses 
are the only basis upon which market value can fairly be de-
termined. Citing U.S. v. Miller 317 U. S. 369, 63 S. Ct. 276, 
86 L. Ed. 336." 
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Our Utah Supreme Court has held the same thing in the case of 
State v. Tedesco 4 Ut 2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028 in holding that the eval-
uating of condemned farm ground would not support the proposition 
that if the land were subdivided into residential lots that it would be 
of a higher value. The Court says: 
"A condemnee is not entitled to realize a profit on his prop-
erty. It must go to the condemnor for its fair market value 
as is, irrespective of any claim to value based on an aggre-
gate of values of individual lots in a subdivision which one 
hopes to sell at a future time to individuals rather than to 
an individual." 
The Supreme Court of Utah further quotes in that case at Page 
1030: 
"The jury are to value the tract of land and that only. They 
are not to determine how it could best be divided into build-
ing lots, nor conjecture how fast they could be sold, nor at 
what price per lot. A speculator or investor, in deciding 
what price he could afford to pay would consider the chances 
and probabilities of the situation as then actually existing. 
A jury should do the same thing. They are not to inquire 
what a speculator might be able to realize out of a resale in 
the future, but what a present purchaser would be willing to 
pay for it in the condition it is now in. Pennsylvania SVR 
Company v. Cleary 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 468 quoted with ap-
proval in U. S. v. 3,544 Acres of Land, etc. 147 F.2d 596, 
598 
Also see Utah Road Commission v. Hanson 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 
917: 
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"Defendants' additional claim that limitation of access will 
lesson the value of their remaining land should they desire 
to divide and sell it in smaller pieces is likewise without 
merit. The valuation must be on the basis of what a willing 
purchaser would pay now and not what a number of pur-
chasers might be induced to pay in the future for the land 
in smaller parcels." 
CONCLUSION 
In a suit for condemnation of an aerial easement at the end of 
an airport landing strip, it is improper for the Court to assess sev-
erance damages for two reasons applicable in this case. 
The first is that severance damage does not have any application 
where an aerial easement only has been condemned and where there 
is no fee being acquired. 
The second is that it was improper for the Court to allow sev-
erance damages when the property being condemned was agricul-
tural and only by speculation as to a residential development which 
is not probable nor likely could the Court arrive at a figure upon 
which to grant severance damages. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of August, 1976. 
GLEN J. ELLIS, Esquire 
Attorney for Appellant 
P. 0. Box 1849 
359 West Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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